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Chapter 11: The geopolitical boundary solutions to strategic collusion 
Chapter 11 
The geopolitical boundary solutions to strategic collusion 
 
11.1 Introduction  
At the firm level, Gazprom can end up in different European gas market outcomes as a quasi-
monopolist, a dominant or non-dominant firm, involving varying degrees of over- and under-
supply. From an economic perspective, such scenarios may lead Russia to invest strategically or 
not. At the level of the Russian government, Gazprom’s decisions are guided by factors which 
go beyond economic rationale when it comes to geopolitical forces. The case studies in Chap-
ter 9, together with Chapter 10, pertain to the economic fundamentals of the problem; this 
chapter is designed to add another dimension to the real-option game and toolbox-based ap-
proach, namely the additional geo-strategic and geopolitical complexities that come into play 
because of Russia’s position in the international political system and how it perceives that sys-
tem.  
 
As was explained in Chapter 3, shifting Russian perceptions of US intentions and actions in 
and around Russia’s periphery in zero-sum terms influence Russia’s course of action. An im-
portant question is whether Russia can truly wean itself off of its zero-sum view of the outside 
world and move towards one involving relative advantage and interdependence where both 
rivalry and cooperation exist. Developments described in Chapter 3 show that regionally, 
within the post-Soviet space, Russia perceives the world in zero-sum terms. However, with 
regard to gas-consuming, Russia faces its interdependence with other geo-strategic players (e.g., 
EU countries and the US), home to important gas export markets. Russia is also interdepend-
ent with other gas-exporting countries.  
 
As was argued in Chapter 3, US geo-strategic ambitions are based on a drive to secure a diver-
sification of gas flows in and away from the Eurasia gas ellipse. For Russia such a US ambition 
comes as a geo-economic threat, and if successful, the US could undermine Russia’s ability to 
secure its gas interests both in the post-Soviet space (in terms of volumes for Russia’s own 
needs) and in European gas markets (in terms of lost income). Ultimately this could have ad-
verse consequences for Russia’s economic security. The geopolitical dimension of gas flows can 
be appreciated by perceiving Eurasia as one vast chessboard in which the various geo-strategic 
players jostle for potential gas flows from the Euraisan gas ellipse. 
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Based on what we know from chapters 2 and 3, the US will counterbalance Russia geo-
strategically in Eurasia. Russia’s perception of the US as a geo-strategic competitor may induce 
Russia to compete geo-strategically with the US. The impact at the political level of Russia’s 
strategic investments on market structures in European gas markets offers Russia a means to 
compete geo-economically and geopolitically with the US in the rimland. From an economic 
and geopolitical point of view, the option to compete with other gas-exporting countries may 
seem warranted, especially if Russia wants to compete with the US for influence in Europe. 
What then are the implications of the above for cooperation between gas-exporting countries? 
Russia faces an important dilemma: is it going to compete with other gas-exporting countries 
or not, given its geopolitical inclinations?  
 
If avoiding gas market oversupply is an important motive for cooperation of some sort 
amongst gas-exporting countries, then the question remains: What form of cooperation is 
most desirable and feasible for Russia, given the nature of regional and interregional gas mar-
ket(s)? The answer to this question should be held in the light of Russia’s perceptions of the 
outside world. What form of horizontal energy diplomacy, so to speak, is then most suitable 
from a Russian point of view, given its position in and perception of the international political 
system? 
 
11.2 Western challenges to Russia in the Eurasian gas ellipse531  
Aiming to secure its position by influencing the emerging geo-strategic dimension to gas flows 
as a result of the changing international political system, the US seeks to create spheres of in-
fluence in Eurasia. It does so in order to prevent one single power or coalition of land powers 
from dominating the Eurasian continent. This is done either in the form of military and eco-
nomic alliances or by establishing key regimes which are politically receptive to US policies in 
the rimland.  
 
Before assessing the impact of Russia’s perception of the international political system on its 
possible cooperation with other gas-exporting countries, we must acknowledge the geographi-
cal scale at which the West seeks to undermine Russia’s position in the Eurasian gas sphere. 
From a realist and geopolitical perspective, the US will not sit by idly and allow Russia to 
strengthen its hand in Eurasia (by extension of what was discussed in Chapter 2).532 A Russian 
ability to aggregate and/or guide gas flows in Eurasia, and the effect of Russia’s pipelines on 
                                                 
531 The term used here is ‘Euro-Atlantic’ in this context because today, there is not only a US drive to ensure Europe’s gas 
supply diversity (also refer to Chapter 1), there is also an EU-level drive, in part encouraged by the US. 
532 As early as 1992, the US Defense Planning Guidance had as one of its main objectives the prevention of the re-emergence 
of a new rival to the US. The guidance went on to argue that in order to achieve this objective, the US would have to pre-
vent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would be sufficient to generate global power [Clarke and 
Halper 2005]. 
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geopolitical relationships between the US and its Eurasian allies, comes as an important chal-
lenge to US power in Eurasia. It upsets the balance of power in Eurasia: Russia would be able 
to gain control over concentrated economic-strategic resources in Eurasia and expand its geo-
political influence in the rimland (e.g., in Europe).  
 
Recently, however, the Obama Administration appears to have softened its stance on Russian 
gas in Europe. Bressand [2010], for example, argues that “the Obama Administration’s effort 
to ‘reset’ relations with Russia has reduced the divergences of views between key continental 
European countries and the US regarding the risks associated with dependence on Russian gas. 
Washington’s all-out opposition to the Nord and South Stream pipelines has been replaced” 
by an effort “to engage Russia constructively,” as stated by Richard Morningstar, the US Spe-
cial Envoy for Eurasian Energy [Wall Street Journal Europe, 2009]. Be that is it may, the cur-
rent geo-strategic posture of the US conveys that it seeks to directly control the rimland, espe-
cially the Eurasian ‘middle ground’.533 This region provides the main gateways534 to central 
Eurasia (i.e., Central Asia and its surroundings) and is wedged between Eurasia’s major pow-
ers, Europe, Russia, China and India. The US drive to diversify gas flows from the Eurasian 
gas ellipse and to curb the dependence of its European allies on Russian transit is a geo-
strategic given for Russia, whatever its desired course of action. While Russia aims to increase 
its options (i.e., export routes for gas flows), the Euro-Atlantic community seeks to reduce 
Russia’s and increase its own, with the US is an important driving force.  
 
Gateways enable a diversification of gas flows from the Eurasian gas ellipse while also ‘servic-
ing’ US allies in Europe with non-Russian gas, and breaking Russia’s monopoly of influence in 
the region. The establishment of greater control over the transport of oil from the Persian Gulf 
region and the Eurasian middle ground, as well as EU and NATO expansion, provide the US 
with a firm foothold in the rimland.535 The rimland can be used as a staging ground for a fur-
ther diversification flows from the Eurasian gas ellipse.  
 
There are two areas of interest for the US within the Eurasian gas ellipse: the Central Asia and 
Persian Gulf regions, which contain the vast bulk of conventional gas reserves in the ellipse 
outside Russia. In Central Asia, key to the US strategy in the resulting ‘pipeline politics’ has 
been drawing up pipeline routes through pro-US countries in the rimland and skirting the 
territory of possible or actual geo-strategic rivals such as Russia and Iran (e.g., the SCP and 
BTC pipelines), by using the aforementioned gateways. What began as the ‘new great game’ 
                                                 
533 The Eurasian middle ground corresponds with a region inside the rimland lying between Europe, parts of the Middle 
East, Russia and East Asia, i.e., southern Central Eurasia, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
534 Gateways are discussed in Chapter 2. 
535 For any eventual US hegemony in Eurasia, the tying in of the Ukraine and the Caucasus countries is vital, being impor-
tant pivots, both in terms of energy corridors and as areas for force projection [Brzezinski 1997]. 
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during the 1990s,536 i.e., a competition for access to oil and gas in the post-Soviet Caspian Sea 
region, has grown to become a geo-economic competition for gas flows from the Eurasian gas 
ellipse, refer to Map 11.1 below. 
 
11.2.1 Gas flows from the Caspian Sea/Central Asia regions 
The main geo-economic prize for the US in undermining Russia’s economic security is Central 
Asia, specifically the Caspian Sea region (c.f., the heartland) upon which Russia relies for gas 
volumes (see Chapter 6). The region’s central geographical position provides it with a unique 
capability to supply pipeline gas to Russia, Europe, Asia and the Middle East [IEA 2009b]. As 
was explained in Chapter 6, this region plays a pivotal role in Russia’s gas supply portfolio. 
Since 2001 the region has been firmly fixed in a US-NATO effort to ensure a long-run West-
ern presence in Central Asia [Zhiznin 2007]. US and NATO forces are likely to remain for the 
long-term to keep options open in this regard [OSCE 2006]. 
 
From Russia’s perspective a US strategy aimed at diversifying gas flows from the Caspian Sea 
region can undermine Russia’s economic security as ‘diverted’ gas flows, originating from Cen-
tral Asia and the Caspian Sea would no longer flow to the Russian domestic market. The do-
mestic gas market, as was mentioned in Chapter 3 is an important obligation for Gazprom 
because it is a political priority for Moscow, while in addition Central Asian gas flows allow 
Russia to export volumes to European gas markets. This in turn compels Russia to develop its 
domestic gas resources in Yamal, for example, an investment which is likely to also require 
exports to Europe and elsewhere by pipeline or LNG. Oversupply could again result because of 
the sheer size of volumes likely to be made available from investment in Yamal’s resources. 
Hence gas flows in Eurasia are ‘driven’ as much by geo-economic forces as they are by geopo-
litical ones. 
 
Traditionally Central Asia’s energy holdings are restricted to Russia according to the US per-
spective, they could not exercise effective economic or foreign policy independence, and the 
US thus supports the independence of the Caspian Sea littoral states [Blank 2007]. With the 
advent of China in the region, this situation has changed. For the US (and the Euro-Atlantic 
community), equal access for western firms therefore relates strongly to the larger objective of 
safeguarding these states’ independence, sovereignty and prospects for secure development. In 
the case of the Caspian Sea/Central Asia region, securing upstream access has no value unless 
viable alternative export routes are developed to transport gas flows. In the US view, control of 
                                                 
536 The new great game involves a complex interplay between the Central Asian and Caspian Sea countries, neighbouring 
countries such as Iran, Turkey, Pakistan as well as extra-regional powers such as Russia, India, the EU, the US [Amineh 
2003] and more recently, China. For more on the evolution of and details concerning the ‘new great game’ see Amineh 
[2003], Olcott [2006], CIEP [2004], Dekmejian and Simonian [2003] and Klevemann [2003], amongst others. 
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transport routes themselves is important to its own power base in Eurasia. US policy is thus 
geopolitically tainted rather than purely commercial.537 
 
The Azerbaijan–Georgia–Turkey corridor, which was spearheaded by US ties with Azerbaijan, 
is the first exit corridor established by the US after the fall of the Soviet Union. Case study 1 in 
Chapter 9 touched upon the complexity of this case and the role of the US in facilitating this 
corridor. Brzezinski refers to Azerbaijan as “the cork in the bottle containing the riches of the 
Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia” [Brzezinski 1997, p. 47].538 It became the centre of a 
wider post-1991 US campaign to secure oil and gas flows, which by-passed enemies such as 
Iran and would break Russia’s standing monopoly on these flows [CIEP 2004].539 Turkey, a 
NATO member, and Georgia, also both played a pivotal geo-economic role in facilitating the 
construction of the BTC and SCP pipelines.540 
 
During the 1990s, the US became a strong proponent of the trans-Caspian gas pipeline, which 
would act as an extension of the trans-Caucasus pipelines into Central Asia [Dekmejian and 
Simonian 2003; Amineh 2003; CIEP 2004].541 The US has been keen to persuade President 
Berdymukhamedov of the benefits of a gas pipeline to carry gas across the Caspian Sea to 
European markets [MEES 2007b].542 In 2008, the US stressed the importance of diversifying 
Europe’s gas imports because “Gazprom is rapidly gaining control of both the supplies and the 
transmission lines and they will soon encircle Europe,” emphasising the importance of the 
                                                 
537 The symbolic and political value of the corridors, transiting across countries in a region still bearing the marks of the 
Soviet era, outweigh the economic costs involved [OSCE 2006]. However, the US government has had to pressure IEFs to 
invest in pipelines they do not wish invest in, because of the costs and risks involved; the IEFs require a stable investment 
climate in order to achieve their commercial objectives and secure their investments [CIEP 2004]. 
538 Indeed, Azerbaijan’s location is important because the “independence of Central Asian states can be rendered nearly 
meaningless if Azerbaijan becomes subordinated to Moscow’s control.” Azerbaijan’s own and very significant oil (and gas) 
resources can also be subjected to Russian control, once Azerbaijan’s independence has been nullified,” and Brzezinski goes 
on to note that, as far as Russian influence is concerned, “[a]n independent Azerbaijan, linked to Western markets by pipe-
lines that do not pass through Russian-controlled territory, also becomes a major avenue of access from the advanced and 
energy-consuming economies to the energy rich Central Asian republics. Almost as much as in the case of Ukraine, the 
future of Azerbaijan and Central Asia is also crucial in defining what Russia might or might not become” [Brzezinski 1997, 
p. 47]. 
539 Indeed, the driving force behind US policy in the region is anti-monopoly while the driving force behind Russian (and 
Chinese) policy is quintessentially monopolistic in nature [Mann 2006]. The objective of US policy-makers is not only to 
obtain oil and gas from Central Asia but also to control the flow to oil and gas markets in the West and in Southeast Asia 
[CIEP 2004].  
540 This corridor helps explain American enthusiasm for Azeri membership of NATO, which would further help embed 
Azerbaijan in a pro-US nexus in the Caucasus from Baku to Turkey, creating a solid transit link for the corridor itself and 
forestall the formation of a possible Russian-Iranian alliance or strengthening thereof, whether of an energy-related, eco-
nomic or political nature [OSCE 2006]. 
541 The legal status of the Caspian Sea, the broader geopolitical complexities of the region and Russo-Iranian cooperation as 
well as the role of Blue Stream (as was discussed in Case study 1 in Chapter 9) have all so far combined to impede any fur-
ther progress on the trans-Caspian route. 
542 In 2007, the US was even willing to finance trans-Caspian feasibility study, following Russian moves to secure Azeri and 
Turkmen volumes earlier that year. 
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trans-Caspian option along with Nabucco as alternatives to South Stream [PIGR 2008j]. 
Tense relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over their shares of the Caspian Sea 
have also aided in stalling any discussion about the pipeline.543 The trans-Caspian corridor, 
together with the trans-Caucasus corridor, could offer long-term prospects for increased Euro-
pean dependence on Caspian Sea/Central Asian gas and reduce European dependence on Rus-
sian gas [MEES 2008e].544 
 
While the trans-Caspian gas corridor, starting with the SCP, offers one way out for Caspian 
gas, the TAPI pipeline offers another way, albeit speculative at this stage (also see Chapter 6). 
The TAPI has been back on the table since the Taliban’s ‘removal’ from power in 2001, with 
the US keen to promote the TAPI pipeline as a means of enabling Central Asia to reduce its 
economic dependence on Russia. The pipeline is an alternative to the rival IPI project (see 
Chapter 6), as the US also seeks to isolate Iran [PIGR 2008i].545 Iran (under a pro-US regime) 
and Afghanistan546 offer interesting prospects for bringing oil and gas from the Caspian region 
to the Indian Ocean, and to potentially important US allies outside the NATO alliance such 
as Pakistan and India. The call among US policy-makers and military planners in 2009 for 
more US and NATO troops [Financial Times 2009g] supports the view that the US is deter-
mined to maintain its position in the region by supporting an important pro-US regime in 
Afghanistan.547 
 
At stake for the US is an important foothold in between Central Asia (in the heartland) on the 
one hand, and Pakistan and India (in the rimland) on the other; a geo-strategically vital area of 
influence. For the US and its NATO allies, the perceived geo-strategic stake is high in the 
quest to maintain a long-term presence in the energy-rich Central Asian region (and within the 
Eurasian gas ellipse), where Afghanistan offers long-term prospects for a US presence on the 
crossroads between Central Asia, the Middle East and East Asia [Jalalzai 2003].  
                                                 
543 Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan enjoy improved relations as of late, particularly since the advent of Niyazov’s successor in 
Turkmenistan [MEES 2008e]. 
544 Resolving the legal status of the Caspian Sea would form a crucial, initial step in this process. 
545 The establishment of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) bear witness to 
this strategy. 
546 An important potential geopolitical pivot for the Soviet Union, Afghanistan lies roughly placed on the imaginary border 
between the Heartland and the rimland, immediately to the South of the Soviet Union in the rimland. This provides Af-
ghanistan with immense geo-strategic importance for any foreign power and has indeed has long been the site of geopolitical 
competition. The Soviet Union did not invade Afghanistan merely for an ideological cause; the geo-strategic stakes were 
high too. Remarkably, Yuri Andropov, Head of the KGB at the time of the Soviet incursion in Afghanistan, believed the US 
was planning to use Afghanistan and a pro-US Iran and Pakistan as part of broad new front against the Soviet Union in the 
south and to push into Central Asia from that region [Brzezinski 1997]. Conversely, the US believed the Soviet Union was 
bent on using Afghanistan as a platform for eventual domination of the Persian Gulf (in and of itself a weakening of Ameri-
can influence in the Rimland).  
547 While the battle to defeat the Taliban rages on for the US and its NATO allies, energy interests continue to play an im-
portant role in the background. The US has already established permanent bases in Afghanistan and many in US policy 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Map 11.1 Geopolitical spheres of influence, forces and gas flows
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11.2.2 Gas flows from the Persian Gulf: Iraq and Qatar 
For the US, the Persian Gulf region in general, and Qatar in particular, is an immense source 
of potential gas flows. By pipeline (e.g., Iraq) and LNG (e.g., Qatar) these two countries act as 
a potential counterweight to Russia’s pipeline gas dominance of European gas market(s). In 
addition, flows from Iraq and the Persian Gulf to Europe could also help service other US al-
lies in the rimland. The American on-the-ground military presence safely lodges Qatar in the 
US sphere of influence (which does not preclude Qatar from cooperating with other gas-
exporting countries or companies). With the decreasing need in the US for LNG imports, 
there is less emphasis on maintaining energy security in the Gulf for LNG tanker traffic. Nev-
ertheless, oil supply security, the potential geopolitical threat of Iran, and long-run interests in 
the Eurasian middle ground provide the US with sufficient reason to keep Qatar within its 
sphere of influence as a geo-strategic lynch-pin for US Central Command (CENTCOM).548 
Exxon Mobil’s close partnership with QP certainly goes hand-in-hand with a strong US mili-
tary presence in Qatar, protecting it from regional rivals such as Iran. 
 
Despite post-2003 instability in Iraq, it is now in the US sphere of influence. With consider-
able Iraqi gas reserves, the playing field has been levelled for foreign investments (also see 
Chapter 7), notwithstanding difficult upstream conditions for the firms in question.549 In ‘rim-
land’ terms, the 2003 Iraq war fits into the wider geo-strategic vision the US has of controlling 
the Persian Gulf region and securing the most important oil reserves for the long-run.550 Be-
sides the political developments in Iraq, geopolitical forces in the region at large should also be 
taken into account.551 From a geo-economic point of view, Iraqi gas flows to Europe have be-
come plausible since the removal of the Hussein regime in 2003. In the geo-economic compe-
tition for the Eurasian gas ellipse, this has tilted the playing field in favour of the Euro-Atlantic 
community in the long run.  
                                                 
548 In the case of the Persian Gulf, transport is less of an issue since LNG is free of transit issues, though the Strait of Hormuz 
bedevils tanker traffic from the Gulf. Iran’s position vis-à-vis the Hormuz Strait is one of the reasons why Iran forms an 
important bottleneck for US policy in the region and a major security threat.  
549 Iraq offers potential gas for Europe in the longer run, as Matthew Bryza explained: “the US, Turkey and government of 
Iraq have a trilateral working group […] that aims to lay the foundations for investment in Iraq’s gas sector to get its [gas] 
production going and complement Azerbaijan’s production for a project like Nabucco, or the Turkey-Greece-Italy pipeline” 
[AGC 2008b].  
550 For the US, Iraq and the possibilities for privatisation of some of the largest untapped oil reserves in the world, could also 
potentially undermine OPEC’s ability to regulate the oil market In the long run [Boon von Ochssée 2006]. Regime change 
in Iraq became necessary in the US calculus for geo-strategic reasons as well, centring on concerns about preserving Israel’s 
power base in the Middle East, securing access to oil reserves and flows and containing Iran’s regional ambitions [Noreng 
2006]. As former US president Carter notes: “[T]here are people in Washington […] who never intend to withdraw military 
forces from Iraq and they’re looking for ten, 20, 50, years in the future […] the reason that we went into Iraq was to estab-
lish a permanent military base in the Gulf region, and I have never heard any of our leaders say that they would commit 
themselves to the Iraqi people that ten years from now there will be no military bases of the United States in Iraq” [CNN 
Larry King Live 2006]. 
551 Consider the ability of Iran to affect Iraq’s stability and sovereignty, as well as the geopolitical roles of neighbouring coun-
tries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey with regard to Iraq. 
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11.2.3 The role of the EU and the European powers 
During the 1990s it was the US which became an important geopolitical and geo-economic 
factor in Eurasia and, specifically, in the post-Soviet space. The expansion of the EU to include 
27 member states in 2004, and a neighbourhood policy that now overlaps with Russia’s near 
abroad policy, has already made the EU a new player in the post-Soviet space. Hence, along-
side the US, the EU has become a more independent actor with soft but relatively few hard 
powers. EU-level initiatives, such as the ‘Southern Corridor’ and the CDC (see Case study 2, 
Chapter 9), which run parallel to US drives to create alternative gas flows from the Caspian 
Sea region to Europe as discussed above, bear witness to Europe’s efforts to formulate an ex-
ternal gas strategy. The EU was hitherto mostly concerned with internal developments such as 
absorbing new member states (which the EU still struggles with today) and the development of 
an internal gas market. European views however have become more receptive to rhetoric about 
over-dependence on Russian gas and this catalysed a ‘security’ debate over the matter after the 
2006 Russia-Ukraine gas row [Saunders 2008].552 
 
The Southern corridor: Gas from both the Gulf and Caspian by pipeline to Europe 
While the US advocates its own gas transport corridors, the EU also toys with import route 
diversification schemes, primarily embodied on paper by the so-called ‘southern corridor’ and 
the CDC. With EU expansion, and new possibilities for gas exploration and production in 
Iraq, the geo-economic significance of Iraq and the Caspian Sea increased. The so-called 
‘southern corridor’ is the EU’s latest pet project to tie in gas flows from Azerbaijan via the 
Caucasus (Shah Deniz, phase II), and from the Persian Gulf region. A vast arc of gas resources 
can thus be accessed by the EU, with the main conduit potentially being the Nabucco pipe-
line. So far this pipeline lacks a gas reserve base. Ideally, the Nabucco would bundle supplies 
from all these countries. While Nabucco has been on the drawing board for a number of years, 
the notion of Iraqi gas supplying Europe is new (as discussed above and in Case study 2, 
Chapter 9). Interconnections between Nabucco and the AGP are also on the drawing board. 
EU energy ambitions have come to lead a life of their own in spearheading the discussion over 
gas from the regions mentioned above, transcending US influence there.  
 
11.3 Towards strategic and ad hoc collusion 
From the section above, and given what we know about Russia’s gas interests in the post-
Soviet space and in Europe, it is clear that Russia faces a geo-strategic challenge from the US. 
In Russia’s view, the US seeks to undermine Russia as a geopolitical power in Eurasia. The 
analysis carried out in chapters 8 through 10 point to the economic underpinnings of deciding 
whether or not to compete, in which Gazprom’s perspective was taken. Various forms of coop-
                                                 
552 The US is also aware that it will not likely win broad support in Europe for a tougher line against Russia, especially as far 
as gas supply security is concerned [Saunders 2008]. 
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eration between gas-exporting countries at a firm level and other related aspects were discussed 
in Chapter 10. Yet another leap is needed to arrive at the issue of whether or not Russia, at the 
government level, is willing to cooperate with other gas-exporting countries. This hinges on 
Russia’s perception of the outside world. 
 
11.3.1 Competition versus cooperation: Russia’s ideas 
Russia may ultimately proceed with investing strategically, and thus compete with gas-
exporting countries at large, because of the following main points: 
1) Scenarios in which Gazprom ends up with a greater market share and thus a greater in-
come, in and of themselves enhance Russia’s economic security. This security buttresses 
Russia’s state coffers and enhances its relative advantage in the international political sys-
tem. This is a particularly attractive option if Russia perceives the structure of the interna-
tional political system in Hobbesian terms. 
2) The resulting increased gas import-dependency of its European markets (as a result of the 
realisation of an aggressive investment policy), and the countries through which and to 
which its gas pipelines are laid (and the gas which flows through them), offer Russia fur-
ther political currency with the relevant governments on the receiving end of the value 
chain. Positioning itself as aggregator of gas resources in Eurasia provides Russia with geo-
political strength vis-à-vis the US. Proceeding with its strategic investments along the en-
tire gas value chain, including the mid-stream pipelines discussed in Chapter 9 may, in 
Russia’s perception, strengthen its position as a geo-strategic player. 
 
From a geo-economic perspective, the SSEE market is the most sensitive sub-regional Euro-
pean market for Russia, given the points above. It is imperative that Russia keeps out potential 
flows from Iraq, Iran and the Caspian Sea region, because the gas reserves of the ellipse could 
lead to important market share losses, particularly if transported by pipeline. As Case study 2 
has demonstrated, the South Stream is endowed with a special geo-strategic, rather than only 
economic-strategic value by making such pipelines obsolete when built on time. 
 
From competition to cooperation  
The development of the interregional gas market and separate regional gas markets bear wit-
ness to the increasing interdependence of gas-exporting countries’ export ambitions. As illus-
trated in Chapter 10, if other gas-exporting countries also decide to invest strategically, gas 
market oversupply can result. Rather than being strengthened, Russia’s economic security 
would be weakened, as would its aspiration of resurrecting its position as a geopolitical player. 
Gas market oversupply could jeopardise Russia’s domestic economic situation, which it has 
tried hard to stabilise during the 1990s. Russia may wish to gain a greater market share, but 
the threat to its economic security, because of the prospect of gas market oversupply, should 
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compel it to seek cooperation with other gas-exporting countries if it wishes to protect its eco-
nomic security.  
 
Russia is dependent on gas markets (and other geo-strategic players) for gas export revenues. 
Additionally, Russia must take this world of interdependence into account. Chapter 3 illus-
trated that at a global level, Russia is aware of its interdependence with other geo-strategic 
players. The Russian energy diplomacy within the GECF and the Troika further highlight its 
preparedness to cooperate with other gas-exporting countries. Russia’s identity as a great power 
will determine the shape and form such cooperation may take later on in time, as will be ar-
gued below. Because Russia increasingly perceives the world in terms of relative advantages, 
cooperation with other gas-exporting countries is an attractive option for Russia, both at the 
country and at the firm level.  
 
11.3.2 Barriers to binding, open and explicit cooperation 
If Russia chooses to cooperate because it successfully perceives and acknowledges its interde-
pendence with other gas-exporting countries, then what shape is likely to be most suitable ac-
cording to the Russian perspective? At face value, cooperation may seem desirable to avoid 
oversupplies. However, Russia may perceive formal, binding commitments to cooperate as an 
option that could undermine its policy independence [Finon 2007]. As Stern notes, the impe-
tus Russia has given to the GECF and its joint foundation of the Troika with Iran and Qatar 
compels a reassessment of earlier dismissals of the GECF as an organisation lacking any sub-
stance [Stern 2009]. As discussed in Chapter 7, Russia has taken a more active role in the 
GECF and co-founded the Troika in the period 2006-2008. Ultimately, how these organisa-
tions will evolve and develop in the future, depends on how Russia behaves as a great power. 
The fact that Russia’s is the biggest (conventional) gas reserve-holder in the world definitely 
plays an important role in this respect.  
 
For Russia, cooperation with important gas-exporting countries in and outside the gas ellipse 
translates into political power because of Russia’s ability to gain influence vis-à-vis the US in 
the rimland. Such cooperation also enhances Russia’s bargaining position vis-à-vis the EU. The 
possibility of organising political cooperation and cohesion through common interest in a 
comparatively new dossier, i.e., in the sphere of an expanding but uncertain, interregional gas 
market, offers Russia additional international political clout. International, horizontal energy 
diplomacy may therefore prove to be expedient, as long as it does not affect Russia’s sover-
eignty. A number of barriers to open and formal cooperation à la OPEC persist. Depending 
on gas market and political developments, cooperation in the interregional gas market may 
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develop tacitly553 or become more explicit. Below it is argued why, from a Russian perspective, 
cooperation is likely to remain ad hoc: 
 
1) Cost of maintaining long-term binding commitments  
From a theoretical point of view, lasting and formal collusive outcomes are notoriously unsta-
ble, especially because binding commitments are required (see Chapter 4). In the interregional 
gas market, very long-term commitments would be needed to sustain effective collusion across 
all regional and interregional projects [Finon 2007]. Parallel behaviour and tit-for-tat signal-
ling also offer means to collude, short of full cartelisation. The geopolitical complexities in-
volved, as discussed above, also make binding commitments difficult to achieve. In addition, if 
Russia were to play the role of a swing supplier in a more liquid European gas market, it would 
have to bear the significant costs inherent to being a balancing supplier just as Saudi Arabia 
does in the oil market. 
 
2) Policy independence  
A Russian desire to maintain its policy independence and its self-perception as a great power 
may incline it to refrain from full, formal cooperation (rather than merely as a regional, less 
comprehensive power such as Saudi Arabia as far as the world oil market is concerned) [Finon 
2007]. Russian leaders prefer to adopt an independent energy policy without limiting their 
choices by joining a collective grouping [Bahgat 2009]. Russia’s arm’s length cooperation with 
OPEC (and, at times, its tendency to expand production when OPEC withholds volumes), as 
well as its refusal so far to join the oil cartel points to Russia’s desire to steer an independent 
course [Nefte Compass 2009].554 Consider how Russia has attended OPEC meetings as an 
observer, and informally attempted to influence deliberations, without actually being a mem-
ber and without carrying the burden of being a swing supplier [Finon 2007]. Russia has also 
tried to strengthen its influence on OPEC’s decision-making by promoting bilateral relation-
ships with individual OPEC member states [Elass and Jaffe 2009].555  
 
                                                 
553 As opposed to formal forms of cooperation such as OPEC., tacit collusion is more politically expedient and better suits 
the rather divergent nature of interests between the various gas-exporting countries, also refer to Chapter 4 for a definition of 
tacit collusion. 
554 It is worthy to note that during late 2009, Russia is reported to have exceeded oil production levels it agreed upon with 
OPEC amid a period of dampening oil prices in 2008-2009, with the structure of the Russian oil market also being an 
important factor to take into consideration (also see Chapter 3) [Gulf News 2009]. Besides, unlike many OPEC countries, 
which have only one NEF and thus have more direct and simple control over their oil sectors, Russia has two government-
controlled National energy firms in its oil sector while the remainder is outside the control of the state. On other occasions 
as well, Russia preferred to act unilaterally in deciding upon oil production vis-à-vis OPEC, free riding on the back of efforts 
to restrain production by the oil cartel (e.g., in 1999 – 2000). Russia’s behaviour with regard to OPEC in oil market is 
telling. This behaviour points to a Russian desire to act independently of what courses of action other oil and gas producing 
and exporting countries recourse to, notwithstanding the economic circumstances.  
555 Russia monitors OPEC specifically to prevent adverse impacts on its decisions on Russian crude exports and maintain 
price stability [Lee 2007]. 
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From a historical point of view, OPEC agreements have only been truly successful from a sup-
ply point of view on a limited number of occasions [Van der Linde 1999]. The advantage of 
the Troika is that it includes very few members able to possibly influence the geography of the 
interregional gas market in the very long-run (beyond 2020-2030). With few very large (po-
tential) players in the interregional gas market, it is easier to collude and make agreements on 
strategic investments than it is in cases involving a greater number of members in other oli-
gopolistic settings. Even a slight increase in the number of players tends to vastly increase co-
ordination difficulties and encourages cheating. Through pipeline-for-LNG swaps in the short 
run, and agreements of a more long-term nature (see Chapter 10), Russia and Qatar alone can 
have a considerable impact on the structure of the interregional gas market by calibrating their 
activities in Asia-Pacific region and Europe, leaving the US as a residual LNG market.556 
 
Russia’s self-perception as a great power that pursues its own goals and objectives independ-
ently of other countries goes hand-in-hand with its self-perception as the largest conventional 
gas reserve-holder. Possible cooperation with other gas-exporting countries fits into a wider 
framework for Russia, in which the power it derives from its position as a powerhouse in the 
gas world is can be used as a bargaining chip in other dossiers. Russia requires room in its pol-
icy-making in the gas sphere in order to have the freedom of manoeuvre to gain or make con-
cessions on other matters of importance to its international standing. 
 
3) Diverging interests of the top three gas reserve-holding countries  
The membership of the GECF is large and therefore politically cumbersome [Jaffe and Soligo 
2006]. This may point to a motive for Russia to set up the Troika: maintaining its ties in the 
sphere of potential cooperation with the limited number of the world’s top gas reserve holders. 
In and of itself, this points to Russia’s ostensible preference for tacit collusion. With such a 
small grouping, formal agreements are less necessary than is the case when many actors are 
involved. Whatever the shape and form of collusion that best suits the rigidity of the interre-
gional gas market in the long run, with Russia as an important actor herein, relations between 
Russia and Iran557 and between Russia and Qatar (i.e., within the Troika) are of crucial impor-
tance in the long run. Relations with Qatar may well be strongly influenced by that country’s 
relationship with the US, thus possibly complicating or acting as barrier to Russia’s scope for 
cooperation with this small sheikhdom.  
                                                 
556 After a meeting between Russian and Qatari gas delegations, Gazprom issued a statement saying it had discussed the ‘high 
potential’ for LNG deals with QP, as well as pipeline gas sales to Europe and Asia [WGI 2010d]. 
557 Bilateral Russo-Iranian cooperation (also see Chapter 6) is more of a tactical nature than a form of long-term strategic 
congruence or a hard alliance [Amineh 2003]. It is difficult to establish whether Iran and Russia may act as rivals or partners 
on a permanent basis, they likely to remain loosely partnered. Given the geopolitical and geo-economic relationship of Rus-
sia and Iran alone, as well as their sway over Central Asia, a hotly contested region for involving ‘pipeline politics’ (also see 
below), cooperation between these two countries predisposes collusion in the interregional gas market to geopolitical as well 
as geo-economic forces.  
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Both countries’ interests may diverge widely: Qatar’s reserves are very high relative to its popu-
lation size, and the need to maintain output to generate revenue is not as urgent as in Russia’s 
case. In addition, Qatar’s heavy reliance on LNG exports provides it with much more flexibil-
ity than Russia, which for now mostly relies on pipeline gas exports [Bahgat 2009]. For Russia, 
Iran may act either as a rival or as a potential partner, the line between cooperation and com-
petition between Russia and Iran may prove to be very thin depending on market or geopoliti-
cal circumstances [Lee 2007] (also see Chapter 6). There is no guarantee both countries may 
not seek to compete for gas flows and markets in the future [Finon 2007]. Qatar also sees Iran 
as an important security threat to the Gulf at large as well as to itself, while both countries also 
still have to resolve issues concerning the shared North Field (i.e., South Pars for Iran). Further 
complicating matters are the many common interests that Qatar has with the US. 
 
4) Dependence on gas earnings and security of demand 
Russia remains as dependent on markets for it gas earnings as these remain on Russia for gas 
supplies. In dealing with the US and Europe as well as China, i.e., other great or emerging 
powers, Russia’s tacit alignment with other gas-exporting countries may be more politically 
expedient than explicit and formal cooperation. Explicit, formal cooperation may constrain 
Russia’s foreign policies on other dossiers. Russia is therefore not likely to engage in open co-
operation with other gas-exporting countries at the expense of relations with European cus-
tomers, who may perceive any ostensible attempts by Russia to collude ‘against’ consumers 
with apprehension. These consumers could pursue strategies which may undermine gas de-
mand in Russia’s gas export markets. In other words, security of gas demand is an important 
priority for Moscow. 
 
5) Market division and long-term contracts  
The carving up and division of markets through the establishment of long-term contracts, 
which lock in customers, suits gas industry dynamics and fit the nature of the gas trade, which 
does not require explicit or more formal collusion. The rise of new business models for LNG 
and pipeline gas challenges the solid underpinnings of these long-term contracts. A tacit 
agreement between Russia and Iran for the latter to supply Asian markets and stay out of the 
European gas market is a workable example of tacit market division, wherein the geographical 
location of suppliers and markets play a key role. Of course, as Case study 1 has shown, this is 
also the result of Russia’s deterrence of Iranian gas flows to Turkey and beyond. 
 
6) Gas market development and pricing 
As has been argued in Chapter 10, overcapacities over time eventually translate into price 
competition. With the collapse in gas demand observed in 2008-2009, the LNG gas glut is 
placing extensive pressure on long-term oil-indexation [Stern 2009a]. In the long run devel-
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opment of the interregional gas market, and congruent with industrial organisation theory as 
far as the shift in competition in capacities to prices, issues such as pricing may well become 
more pressing in a steadily more global gas market. Here, some level of more formal collusion 
can be imagined, where Russia would require more formal commitments and binding agree-
ments with other gas-exporting countries.558 For the time being, Russia and other gas-exporting 
countries wish to stick to oil-indexation, regardless of the volumes of flexible supplies in the 
form of LNG and pipeline gas, which now exert downward pressure on oil-indexed contracts.  
 
Towards strategic collusion 
Given the barriers to open, explicit cooperation listed above, Russia’s nature as a great power 
and the obvious need for some type of coordination mechanism to avoid oversupplies (also see 
Chapter 10), what form of cooperation does Russia prefer? Until the interregional gas market 
fully matures, which is a long-run prospect, Russia will prefer ad hoc collusion with other gas-
exporting countries, relying on tacit bilateral agreements and coordination through the GECF 
and/or Troika. Such tacit collusion can occur on capacity schedules, by mutually postponing 
investments, or by sharing them. Russia may in some scenarios even desire to compete rather 
than cooperate. The previous chapter argued that a bandwidth of scenarios exists. The upshot 
is that Russia will not commit to formal and binding agreements à la OPEC, and yet binding 
agreements are key to a cartel’s success if it is to survive, i.e., agreements must be stable. Russia 
will opt for so-called ‘strategic collusion’, which involves collusive behaviour or parallel behav-
iour on coordinating capacities, for example, falling short of outright cartelisation because it is 
not a permanent outcome.  
 
11.3.3 Russia’s integrated gas strategy in Eurasia 
The geo-strategic underpinnings of the US presence in the rimland, and its geo-economic po-
tential to affect gas flows from the Eurasian gas ellipse, call for a comprehensive integrated 
Russian gas strategy. A Russian strategy should be ‘integrated’ in the sense that Russia’s foreign 
policy is to be integrated with and complementary to firm-level policies, i.e., at the level of its 
national champions. It lays beyond doubt that China’s presence in the region is now also a ‘fait 
accompli’, and it too seeks to establish a long-run sphere of influence, particularly in Central 
Asia. Also of great importance is the potential of China (and other Asian economies) as both a 
market for Russian gas and as a rival geo-strategic player in the Eurasian gas ellipse that seeks 
to monopsonise gas flows from both the Central Asian and Persian Gulf regions. Russia is 
likely to use institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the 
                                                 
558 Ironically, OPEC and other oil producing and exporting countries that also export gas can (see Map 8.1) can manipulate 
gas prices in long-term contracts by propping up oil prices (taking into account a time lag between oil prices and gas prices, 
however). Thus by effecting oil prices, the OPEC countries can indirectly influence gas prices in long-term contracts 
[Hallouche 2006], while according to Zhiznin [2007], OPEC countries wish to avoid over-exporting LNG in order to 
prevent a decrease in oil prices [Zhiznin 2007]. 
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CSTO as a nexus of political and economic cooperation in the energy sphere vis-à-vis China, 
especially in Central Asia and perhaps beyond.559  
 
11.4 Conclusion 
From a Russian perspective, the US attempts to suffocate Russia’s gas and other interests in 
Eurasia. This is Russia’s heritage from the 1990s: a Hobbesian view of the world in which Rus-
sia is compelled to compete geo-strategically with the US. Strategic investments provide Russia 
with geopolitical power and are geo-economic tools that provide Russia with geopolitical cur-
rency in the rimland. However, the risk of regional gas market oversupply thus also arises. 
 
Russia hence faces a dilemma: it seeks to defend its position in Eurasia, having to compete geo-
strategically with the US yet must take into account its interdependence with geo-strategic 
players and other gas-exporting countries in a steadily more globalised world. In the former 
case, losses to the US are seen in zero-sum terms, particularly in the post-Soviet space when it 
comes to geopolitical influence as well as gas interests. In the latter case, room is made for eco-
nomic and strategic cooperation with other gas-exporting countries because Russia does not 
necessarily perceive the world in zero-sum terms vis-à-vis the US. In this case, Russia desires to 
avoid the domestic economic instability resulting from considerable gas market oversupplies 
abroad.  
 
Coordination is to be pursued between Russia and other gas-exporting is unlikely to resemble 
explicit OPEC-type collusion or cartelisation of the interregional gas market. Given Russia’s 
self-perception as a great power and its geopolitical perception of the outside world, strategic 
collusion within the GECF or within the Troika or a combination of both is more likely. Such 
collusion is strategic in that it serves a certain purpose for Russia, but is never a permanent 
given for Russian policy, and is likely to hinge more on key bilateral relations with key gas-
exporting countries. Moreover, Russia wishes to maintain room for manoeuvre in its policies 
outside the gas sphere, requiring it to keep its options open in its commitments to other gas-
exporting countries.  
 
Economically and strategically it may be beneficial for Russia to cooperate with other gas-
exporting countries but its identity as a great power and its geopolitical aspirations prevent 
Russia from making any binding commitments. Even though it has taken greater interest in 
playing a leading role within the GECF in recent years, and is one of the drivers of the Gas 
Troika initiative, formal cooperation is unlikely to suit Russian interests, as Russia is a power 
                                                 
559 Depending on geopolitical relations mainly between Russia, China and the US, the SCO could be used as a forum for 
Russia and China to defend their common Eurasian interests against the US. A Kissinger-style US foreign policy of playing 
off Russia against China could diminish the likelihood of such a partnership between these two Eurasian powers. 
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with the desire to maintain policy independence. In addition, the interests of gas-exporting 
countries differ widely: while Russia’s preference for long-term contracts and oil-indexation 
encourage Russia to take an independent stance on issues such as pricing. 
 
In the bid for the control of gas flows, the Eurasian gas ellipse will become a field of increased 
competition in the longer term, particularly if the US pursues its goal of servicing its European 
NATO (and other) allies. The struggle to influence the playing field in the Eurasian gas ellipse 
adds a geopolitical character to possible gas market coordination that neither standard cartel 
theory nor the real-option game model can capture. What is more, as discussed above, Russia’s 
decision whether to compete or not with other gas-exporting countries hinges to a large extent 
on its perception of the international political system. The decision on Russia’s part not to 
compete with other gas-exporting countries–and by extension successful collusion–is subject to 
geopolitical, rather than merely economic boundary solutions.  
